Appeal Court Says Judges Cannot Avoid Determinations of Grave Risk of Harm in Hague Convention Cases

The Ontario Court of Appeal recently reversed a Hague Convention order that a mother from England must return to England with her two children, failing which her British husband would have custody of their children. (Zafar v. Saiyid (2018) ONCA 352)

As is becoming typical in Hague cases, the mother and her two young children who had Canadian citizenship,travelled to Canada for a summer holiday, with the permission of her spouse, and the intention of returning to England by a prescribed date.

On August 23, the mother advised the children’s father that their marriage was over and that she would remain in Ontario with the children. He promptly filed a Hague Convention application seeking the return of the children.

At the court hearing the mother conceded that the children’s habitual residence was England, which is the primary question when a Hague application is brought. The law is very clear that children must be returned to their habitual residence where the question of their residence will be determined.

However, Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention permits a removing parent to argue that the child should not be returned where the other parent poses a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child or the spouse. Ms. Saiyid alleged that her husband was “threatening, verbally abusive, financially controlling” and presented “intolerable behaviour towards the mother, smoke and drank”, which reflected an inability to create ” a safe environment free of danger for the children.”

The hearing judge ordered the mother to return the children to England by December 1, failing which the children’s father would have sole custody of the children. He said:

“In a Hague application, I am not to determine the best interests of the children, only jurisdiction. In any event, on affidavits I cannot determine who is telling the truth about Mr. Zafar’s conduct.”

On November 27 the mother obtained a stay of the judge’s order, however, shortly thereafter she voluntarily returned to England with the children and brought an application to the British court seeking orders that she may relocate to Canada with the children.

Nonetheless, she wished to continue with her appeal in Ontario on the basis that the judge’s alleged errors of law could be used against her in the new British proceeding.

The appeal court agreed that her appeal was not moot for the reason she identified and held that the hearing judge erred in stating that he could not determine whether the children were at grave risk of serious harm, delegating that issue to the English courts. The court held that the hearing judge ought to have made a decision based on the record; or considered whether it was appropriate to hear oral evidence from the parties. The hearing judge’s decision to explicitly decline to consider the matter was an error in law.

While the task is enormous, where conduct allegations are thrown back and forth haphazardly, it is a judge’s duty to sift the wheat from the chaff. Oral evidence, with cross-examination is often the best way of doing that. These cases are the most difficult, particularly when young children are involved, when the question becomes “which parent is most believable?”

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

Courtrooms Flooded with Litigants With No Lawyers

It’s not getting any easier to be a judge these days, as self-represented litigants continue to overwhelm Canadian courts in increasing numbers.

With the abolition of Legal Aid and a middle-class that can’t afford to hire lawyers, the situation has become dire.

University of Windsor law professor Julie MacFarlane’s research indicates that up to 80% of court users in family law go into court without a lawyer.

The popular cliché that people who represent themselves in court have fools for clients has never been more true, and despite the increasing availability of pro bono legal services, rarely does free legal advice mean that a lawyer will show up in court.

While it is lawyers that have the reputation for talking too much and wasting court time, the truth is that court cases with lay litigants take up many more court hours because rules of evidence and procedure, while somewhat relaxed for in-person litigants, must still be maintained to ensure due process and the integrity of our justice system.

In a recent court case, with no counsel, where the issue was whether a Pakistani divorce was authentic and legitimate, one judge said:

“I record that I began this case at 10.30 a.m. this morning and I am now concluding it around 3.30 p.m. It has, accordingly, effectively occupied the whole of the court day. By sheer good fortune, the other case which had been listed for hearing by me today was vacated [postponed] yesterday for reasons connected with its readiness. If that case had not been vacated, I, and the litigants in that case, would have been faced with very considerable difficulties and a severe shortage of court time, and probably also additional expenditure to the parties in that case who, as likely as not, would have to have returned on another day.”

The judge found that the divorce was valid, but was justice really served when he noted that he did not have any basic materials, no orderly bundle of relevant documents, no chronology, no case summaries, and no real argument.

Professor MacFarlane’s observation that “it’s the inmates who are running the asylum” is sadly apropos.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

The Difficulty of Ridding Your Case of a “Seized” Judge.

It is not unusual, especially in family law cases, to have a judge conclude a hearing with the phrase “I will seize myself of this case”. What that means is that the judge has decided that it is reasonable, necessary, or simply prudent for him or her to hear all future court applications regarding the case.

Often this is good news to the parties and their lawyers, but other times it is a fate that is not welcomed.

Madam Justice Martinson in AA v. SNA 2009 BCSC 387 explained the rationale behind a judge seizing herself of a case:

“[77] It is imperative in high conflict family cases generally, and certainly in cases involving allegations of alienation like this one, that one member of the Court take charge of the case. Having a single judge hear cases is required by s. 14 of the Supreme Court Act:

(1) All proceedings in the court and all business arising from those proceedings, if practicable and convenient, must be heard, determined and disposed of before a single judge.

(2) All proceedings subsequent to the hearing or trial including the final order, except as otherwise provided, and on a rehearing must, if practicable and convenient, be before the judge before whom the trial or hearing took place.

[78] The reasons for doing so for all cases are obvious. The judge will be familiar with the case so the litigants do not have to explain the situation over and over again. It avoids “judge shopping” to try to get a better result. It prevents inconsistent approaches. It saves legal and other costs. There will be times in dealing with some cases when it is not convenient or practical to do so.”

In cases like the latter, judges often seize themselves with the proviso that if the matter is urgent and they are not readily available, then another judge can hear the case.

But often one party, usually the party who consistently “loses”, alleges bias and seeks to rid the case of the seized judge. Recently, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in NRG v. GRG 2017 BCCA 407 weighed in on this topic saying:

“There is much wisdom in Madam Justice Martinson’s observation that a family unit may benefit from a judge seizing him or herself of a case. That does not mean, however, that the seized judge should remain seized to the last application filed. The very fact the judge is seized of the case increases the opportunity to develop an impermissible point of view about the case or the parties, and emphasizes the vital requirement of assiduous objectivity. All trial judges will know there may come a time in the conduct of a case when the judge says, “I have done my best and should pass this to fresh eyes.” In our respectful view, this may be such a time.”

The Appeal Court noted that while the appellant sought an order from the appellate panel reversing the Supreme Court judge’s “seizure” proclamation, the Court observed they lacked jurisdiction to overturn the seizure, not wishing to interfere with the lower court’s process, and also did not characterize it as an order of the court. They suggested that a litigant must appear before the seized judge or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to obtain such a direction.

Frequently, a complaint against a judge who has seized himself is accompanied by an application requesting a judge to remove himself from a case based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, another application that must go before the judge in question and is most commonly dismissed.

I remember a case many years ago where I drew what I believed to be an “unfavourable” judge and convinced opposing counsel to adjourn the case so that settlement discussions could ensue. When we advised the court we were adjourning by consent, the clever judge declared that he would be seized of the case, despite hearing no evidence at all. It was clear he figured out that the adjournment was an escape from his courtroom…and he was right!

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

How “Uncivil” Can a Lawyer be in Court? The Groia Case

If you are a litigator in Canada you should know the name “Joe Groia”. He is a masterful legal advocate from Ontario who specializes in securities law. His prominence in the legal profession was capped this week when Groia v. The Law Society of Upper Canada (now the Law Society of Ontario) was argued before the Supreme Court of Canada. (Law Society of Upper Canada v. Joseph Peter Paul Groia, 2012 ONLSHP 94)

Why is Mr. Groia suing Ontario’s Law Society and why would the Supreme Court of Canada agree to hear his case? In June 2012 the Law Society held that Mr. Groia had professionally misconducted himself while defending his client John Felderhof in an action taken against him by the Ontario Securities Commission. You may recall that Mr. Felderhof was second in command at Bre-X Minerals Ltd, the Canadian-owned gold mine in Borneo that turned out to be a fraud, leaving thousands of investors with losses of hundreds of millions of dollars after investing in the bogus company.

Groia’s representation of Mr. Felderhof was second-to-none, as Mr. Felderhof, after 160 days of trial, was acquitted of all charges. However, the Law Society took it upon themselves to call Mr. Groia to account for his allegedly “uncivil” behaviour during the proceedings, conduct so egregious that during the trial, lawyers for the Ontario Securities Commission asked the judge to stop the trial arguing that he had lost jurisdiction by failing to rein in Mr. Groia’s outrageously rude behaviour in the courtroom. That application failed and the trial continued.

Two Ontario courts reviewed and upheld the Law Society’s ruling against Mr. Groia, describing his trial conduct as “unrestrained invective”, excessive rhetoric”, “theatrically excessive”, “sarcastic and petulant”, “more guerrilla theatre than advocacy in court”, and “attacks on the prosecutor’s integrity”.

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy and significant to Mr. Groia’s defence that the trial judge did not hold him in contempt, neither did he report Mr. Groia’s trial behaviour to the Law Society.

Groia, in rebuttal offered the following arguments:

1. He cast no personal aspersions against opposing counsel, but only targeted the Securities Commission and the prosecution;

2. His basis for alleging prosecutorial misconduct was based on his reasonably held views;

3. His language was mischaracterized by the Law Society and the courts;

4. The tone of the trial was an important factor in assessing his conduct, particularly in light of the prosecutor’s behaviour;

5. The Law Society retroactively applied standards of the “civility movement” to his conduct; and

6. His obligation as an effective advocate outstripped any absence of civility.

Without reading the whole of the transcripts of the trial, it is difficult to assess whether Mr. Groia’s behaviour fell so far below the standard of professionalism of a barrister that he ought to have been sanctioned by the Law Society. His original punishment was a two-month suspension of his license to practice law and an order that he pay costs of $250,000. This penalty was later reduced by the courts to a one-month suspension and $200,000 in costs.

Mr. Groia would, of course, argue that even reading the transcripts one would not be in a position to assess the conduct and roles of each of the counsel and judge at the trial and that may very well be true. It’s the old story that “you had to be there” to understand the dynamics.

Media reports from the hearing in the Supreme Court of Canada this week, appear to underscore the high court’s focus on the absence of disapproval from the trial judge, who was best placed to determine whether Mr. Groia’s conduct sunk to a level where he deserved to be chastised or disciplined.

As a trial lawyer in hard-fought cases, I tend to agree that it is not the Law Society’s place to interfere as a back-seat referee in a hotly contested proceeding where an unsuccessful defence will lead to dire consequences for the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada clearly wants to provide guidance to litigators. We must now wait to see what the Supremes think…

Not Ready for Trial? Ontario Court Says Too Bad….

An Ontario judge has spoken out clearly about counsel who book trials and then abandon them on short notice to the courts. In Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2017 ONSC 6568, Mr. Justice Pazaratz called the case, involving a reduction or termination of spousal support, only to learn that the litigants in the case were not available, and an adjournment was sought by both counsel.

Counsel had earlier agreed and the court permitted them to adjourn the trial, then set for August 2017. At that hearing, counsel had agreed the trial would proceed in October 2017 for three days.

Counsel advised the court that an error had occurred and their clients incorrectly believed the rescheduled trial would take place in January 2018. Counsel also stated that a settlement conference had not been booked which might assist the parties to settle. As well, one of the lawyers indicated he had a doctor’s appointment that afternoon. Judge Pazaratz queried counsel as to why a trial was booked if settlement had not yet been explored, and also opined that the court would and could work around counsel’s medical appointment, but that did not justify an adjournment of the trial. He also said:

“The implications of attending court on day one of a three day trial and requesting an adjournment go far beyond merely wasting one day of court time. Judges and trials are scheduled based on a balancing of multiple scheduling considerations. If this three day time slot becomes wasted, there may be far-reaching consequences (for example another three day trial could have been called, but if I am only available for two more days this week, it means I don’t have enough time to deal with that other matter).”

Judge Pazaratz advised counsel to get their clients to court immediately so the matter could proceed unless a settlement was reached, and warned them that if the matter was not settled and the trial did not go ahead, he would dismiss their case.

Counsel returned with a consent order in which each party withdrew their claims on a without prejudice basis, however, the Court was not impressed with counsels’ tactics saying:

“The problem, of course, is that if people can simply withdraw claims when they aren’t ready for trial, there’s nothing to stop them from re-commencing those claims in short order, and creating even further stress and expense for the system. We have an obligation to ensure that judicial resources are appropriately utilized and not misused. I am not prepared to allow the parties to simply withdraw their claims on a without prejudice basis.”

Judge Pazaratz then dismissed the claims, but not on the merits, saying that if either party wished to return to court to deal with any of the claims, they would require permission from the Court to proceed, and that in the event that occurred, he would be the judge dealing with the matter.

Where courts are being criticized for a lack of judicial time and unreasonable delays in meting out justice, Judge Pazaratz’s ruling is a welcome response to counsel who abuse the system. While “courthouse steps” settlements are to be encouraged, in this case it was apparent from counsels’ remarks that settlement had not yet been broached; that no trial preparation had been undertaken; and that counsel were content to show up, without their clients, expecting a favourable or neutral response to their self-imposed dilemma.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

COURTROOM FASHION POLICE

Clients often wonder what they should wear to court. I usually tell them that “business casual” is acceptable, but jackets and ties are never out of place. On more than a few occasions an in-person litigant has been so well dressed that the judge assumes he/she is a lawyer. Looking around at certain lawyers’ attire, I am not sure that is a compliment!

So, we know what to wear to court, let’s talk about what not to wear…

Judges in Kent County, Delaware have instituted a formal dress code after one woman appeared in court in her pajamas. (Didn’t Michael Jackson do the same thing during his trial? Yes, but his was designer apparel!)

The list of banned clothing in Kent County includes saggy pants, bare feet, curlers, gang clothes, exposed undergarments, skirts more than four inches above the knee, muscle shirts, tank tops, halters and bare midriffs.

“USA Today” cites other examples of court attire judged to be inappropriate:

1. A woman from Detroit who wore a rumpled sweat suit that read “Hot Stuff” on her derriere;

2. A woman from Bakersfield who came to court with rubber flip-flops;

3. A judge in Texas bans people with excessive body piercings and tatoos that are not covered;

4. A man in Ohio was threatened with jail time for wearing a t-shirt with the horror character Chucky on it and the words “Say Goodbye to the Killer”.

As Mark Twain said “Clothes make the man. Naked people have little or no influence.”

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

Judge Comments that Family Litigants are “Blowing Their Brains Out Fighting”

In yet another British Columbia Supreme Court case, a wise judge points out the folly of the battle between litigating spouses and the accompanying expense, both financially and emotionally.

In Danroth v. Whiting 2017 BCSC 1814 Mr. Justice G.C. Weatherill considered an application to defer the sale of the parties’ family home. The wife had previously obtained an order for the sale of the home with the condition that the husband, who now lived in the home, had a one month reprieve before it would be listed for sale, in order to allow him time to raise the funds required to purchase his wife’s interest.

The 71-year-old husband wished to remain in the home he had lived in for years but had not been able to borrow sufficient funds to buy his wife’s interest. The home was valued at $3.5 million and had a mortgage of $1.2 million, leaving equity of $2.3 million. He needed to pay his wife $1.15 million, but he was only able to borrow $2.2 million, which was insufficient to pay out the mortgage and pay his wife. He was also waiting for an appeal hearing as he had previously appealed the order that the house be sold.

Meanwhile, it appeared the family squabble was to become more complicated as at least one of the parties’ children was contemplating filing a lien, called a caveat, against the title of the property prior to the property’s listing for sale, alleging that he/she had an interest in the property as well.

The judge noted that “this court sees a steady diet of these kinds of family disputes where it is all about money. The parties tend to lose track or lose sight of what really matters. However, that is for another day.”

Ultimately, the court refused to defer the sale, but before finalizing his judgment he spoke frankly to the parties’ counsel:

“……this is a tragic situation…the inevitable result will undoubtedly be that they will regret, if they don’t already, not having taken a step back and considering whether there is another, less tragic, way of resolving their dispute…this family is destined for complete ruin if they carry on as they are…this is all about money and the parties are spending it in droves….It seems to me that the parties could put their money to better use, for their retirement or for their future. The claimant is 71 years. How much more of this does he want to devote to this fight?”

Kudos to Justice Weatherill for taking the liberty that his status affords him, to try to de-escalate the family battle before it is too late. Judges hold tremendous sway over litigants that appear before them and it is heartening to see judges earnestly warn litigants of the fate that befalls them if they continue on the path they are on.

His parting words:”These comments can be taken for what they are worth. This court sees these situations far too often. I wish the parties the best of luck.”

A point of interest: Judge Weatherill is one of two judges sitting on the Supreme Court of British Columbia with the same name. The other justice is his twin brother, and yes, they are hard to tell apart.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

Court of Appeal Orders New Trial for Father Because of Expert’s Fraud on the Court

In a groundbreaking decision last summer after a 147 day trial, Mr. Justice Paul Walker of the British Columbia Supreme Court found that B.C.’s child protection authorities had negligently permitted a father to sexually abuse his children while the youngsters were in the custody of the Ministry. The Court found that the government’s failure to protect the children was “egregious, negligent, and a breach of duty” and government social workers showed a “reckless disregard to their obligation to protect children.”

The evidence before Mr. Justice Walker included expert evidence from Californian Dr. Claire Reeves who had been an expert witness at the 90 day family law trial that preceded the action against the Ministry by several years. Dr. Reeves’ expert opinion played a significant role in the original finding that this father had sexually abused his children.

The parties agreed that her expert evidence from the family law trial would be admitted in the trial alleging negligence against the Ministry. Throughout the lengthy proceedings the father adamantly denied abusing his children, an assertion supported by several expert witnesses, but to no avail, as the court found he had abused them and he was barred from seeing them.

The father, who acted for himself, missed the deadline to file an appeal, however, three years later the Court of Appeal permitted him to proceed with an appeal, based on new evidence that appeared to establish that Dr. Reeves’ evidence was fraudulent. The credentials she touted, including a Doctorate in Clinical Counselling, Masters of Science in Clinical Psychology, Bachelor of Science in Family Mediation, and a Bachelor of Arts in Journalism, were “purchased” from so-called “diploma mills”.

Her assertion that she had testified as an expert on child sexual abuse on numerous occasions in a variety of courts also appeared to be untruthful. The substance of her trial opinion was based on a theory of child abuse that had long been discredited, even by the expert who originally proffered the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome”.

This week, in a 411 paragraph decision, the Court of Appeal (JP v. British Columbia 2017 BCCA 308) held that Dr. Reeves’ fraud impacted the integrity of the entire judicial process, leading to a gross miscarriage of justice. The trial findings that the father was guilty of sexual abuse of his children were thrown out and a new trial ordered. The scathing denouncement of BC’s child protection authorities was also dismissed, the appeal court finding that the alleged misfeasance was the product of procedural unfairness.

What is startling about this case is that the Rules of Court and related case law clearly set out the requirements for the admission of expert evidence, rules and law that were flagrantly ignored by the litigants and the trial judge.

The waste of court time and the related costs in this case are staggering, as the trial occupied months of court time. In my view this case screamed out for the appointment of an “amicus curiae” or “friend of the court”, a lawyer who does not represent the parties, but assists the court with information that bears on the case. The admissibility of evidence issues, other procedural flaws, and the duration of the proceedings should have been red flags for the court.

For the parents of the children in this case, more trial dates are expected. What remains to be seen is whether the mother will file a second negligence lawsuit against the Ministry, which will ultimately depend on the findings in the new family law trial.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

Judge Kreep Censured for Courtroom Levity

Judges hold a special place in the community and are expected to adhere to a set of rules and ethical standards that the average Joe or Jane can choose to ignore. But judges also have their own distinct personalities, biases, attitudes, and ideologies, which they labour to keep in check in order to ensure that justice is both done and seen to be done.

Some judges display severe personalities, no off-the-cuff quips and nary a smile adorns their face, while others have effusive, even bubbly personalities and seem to enjoy interacting with lawyers and the public.

A good example of the latter is Judge Gary Kreep of the San Diego Superior Court who, as a newly elected judge, was criticized for the levity he displayed as he presided over the cases that came before him.

He ended up in judicial disciplinary proceedings before the Commission on Judicial Performance over a number of issues related to his election to the bench, and for comments he made in court, most of which were relatively harmless, but could easily be misconstrued.

When a female litigant appeared before him he commented that he “loved her accent”. Ms. Hernandez was a United States citizen who spoke fluent English with a Mexican accent. He also quipped that he had “no intention of deporting her”.

When it was suggested to him that his comments belittled her, he acknowledged that his reference to deportation was inappropriate but explained that he was simple trying to “get a laugh and put people at ease”.

Judge Kreep also liked to use nicknames for the lawyers, clerks, and interns that regularly appeared in his courtroom. With respect to three legal interns from the Public Defenders Office, he called them “Bun head”, “Dimples” and “Shorty”. Shorty was 6 feet 7 inches tall and testified before the discipline board that Judge Kreep called him Shorty at least ten times while court was in progress.

He also had a penchant for commenting on the attractiveness of the women who appeared in his courtroom, saying, “She’s a pretty girl, you know you could smile”, or “the lovely attorney showed you the form, correct?”

A deputy city attorney, who was pregnant, was the recipient of his attention as well. On one occasion he said to defence counsel, “Let’s get on with this, we don’t want Ms. S. to have her baby in the courtroom.” During other appearances he said “It’s getting closer Ms. S.” and “She wants to go home and have her baby, I’ll pick on her today.”

In criminal court he interacted with a female accused charged with prostitution who entered a guilty plea. He asked her “Ma’am, anything I can do to get you out of the life?” Later he asked her, “Is it you like the money or just like the action?” The accused began responding only to be cut off by Judge Kreep who asked “Are you going to try to get a job at the bunny ranch in Nevada?” This comment was in regards to the accused’s statement that she might leave California. His final remark was “I don’t think it’s a good lifestyle choice, but it your lifestyle choice and it’s your decision.”

At the discipline hearing Judge Kreep testified that his comments were intended to show support for her predicament, and also to persuade her to change her conduct and lifestyle.

In response to the whole of the allegations against him arising from his courtroom decorum, Judge Kreep acknowledged that he ran the proceedings in a casual matter and admitted that his comments could be taken as offensive or demeaning, although that was never his intention. He denied that his levity rose to the level of sexual harassment.

The offenses arising from his election campaign included his failure to report campaign expenses, and the use of his personal credit card and bank account to pay campaign expenses.

The discipline panel found that he engaged in one act of wilful misconduct, 17 acts of prejudicial misconduct and 11 acts of improper action, leading to the most severe form of censure. A minority of the Commission panel would have liked to see his removal from the bench, however, it was noted that most of his offenses occurred during his first year as a judge and he had changed his behaviour since then.

As for his in-court comments, in my view they were neither offensive nor demeaning, although admittedly, calling intern lawyers by fanciful nicknames was a bit odd. It seems to me that Shorty and the others could and should have addressed their discomfort with their nicknames directly with Judge Kreep, who by all accounts appears to be a congenial, likeable fellow.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang

Should Canadian Judges Wearing “Trump” Attire be Disciplined?

Is discipline in order for an Ontario judge who went shopping wearing a “Make American Great Again” t-shirt? What about a judge sitting in court the day after the American election wearing a baseball cap with the same logo?

Local resident Lorne Warwick was also shopping when he saw Justice Toni Skarica, of Ontario’s Superior Court, with the allegedly offensive t-shirt, describing his attire as “shocking” and a “flagrant display” of support for a politician who openly discriminated against Mexicans and Muslims. Mr. Warwick complained to the Canadian Judicial Council, suggesting that Judge Skarica’s fashion choice represented a breach of impartiality rules for judges.

In a letter dismissing Mr. Warwick’s complaint the Canadian Judicial Council referred to his concerns that President Trump was a serial liar, racist, and demagogue and that Judge Skarica’s “embrace” of such a man rendered him unfit to be an impartial arbiter for Canadian citizens before his Court.

The Council was persuaded by Judge Skarica that the t-shirt was simply historical memorabilia that had been given to him by his brother who had been in Washington, DC. He had worn the shirt to show a friend and without thinking, wore it to the grocery store. He confirmed he had not participated in the Trump campaign, had not donated monies, and had never been engaged in activities with the Republican party. Most importantly, he vehemently denied he was a racist.

However, the story for Judge Bernd Zabel is markedly different. He’s the judge that wore a Trump baseball hat in court on November 9, 2016. He apologized for his admitted “lapse in judgment” characterizing it as an attempt at failed humour. He also said:

“This gesture was not intended in any way as a political statement or endorsement of any political views, and, in particular, the views and comments of Donald Trump. I very much regret that it has been taken as such,” he said.

However, a transcript from the court proceedings revealed his support of Donald Trump:

“Brief appearance with the hat. Pissed off the rest of the judges because they all voted for Hillary, so. I was the only Trump supporter up there but that’s okay,”

“Just in celebration of a historic night in the United States. Unprecedented”

Interviewed by the Toronto Star newspaper, Anthony Moustacalis, president of the Ontario Criminal Lawyers’ Association opined:

“Judges like Zabel are outliers in an otherwise elite court led by an innovative and hard-working chief justice. He should have matched their demanding work ethic, read their judgments, or sought their wise counsel,…
Instead, he has besmirched his position and embarrassed his colleagues and he should step down immediately, pending judicial council review, if he has any respect left for the court, and the public.”

A record number of 81 complaints to the Ontario Judicial Council followed, resulting in a directive that Judge Zabel no longer conducting court hearings. His conduct is the subject of a hearing before the Council scheduled for August 23, 2017.

Admittedly Judge Bernd Zabel has called into question his ability to impartially adjudicate matters that come before him, particularly where they involve visible minorities or members of the LGBTQ community. Judges hold a place of honour and prestige in Canadian communities and the slightest taint of bias is sufficient to attract pointed scrutiny and perhaps severe discipline.

Sitting since 1990, Judge Zabel is an experienced jurist who crossed the line, although it should be pointed out that support of Donald Trump does not necessarily mean that a Trump fan endorses every part of his philosophy. Nonetheless, it is one thing for a lay person to support Mr. Trump, but quite another for a judge from the bench to endorse a politician of any stripe.

It remains to be seen whether Judge Zabel’s behaviour results in his removal from the bench.

Lawdiva aka Georgialee Lang